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Little is known about how the brain learns to anticipate the timing of reward. A new study 
demonstrates that optogenetic activation of basal forebrain input is sufficient to train reward timing 
activity in the primary visual cortex. 
 
“Your transaction is being processed.” When you see this message on the ATM screen, you are 
expecting a timed reward while the machine is shuffling out the appropriate notes into the cash 
dispenser: your money. But which part of your brain is actually involved in generating this 
expectation? In a series of recent papers [1–3], one published in this issue of Current Biology [4], 
Shuler and colleagues present a surprising answer: it is, at least in part, your primary visual cortex. 
Primary visual cortex (V1) is the first station for cortical processing of visual information. 
It is textbook knowledge that V1 extracts specific aspects of the visual world and represents 
elementary features such as edges [5]. According to this classical feedforward view of processing, 
sensory information propagates from V1 to later stages of cortical processing where more and 
more complex features of the sensory world are extracted, and eventually to higher-order centers 
that assign behavioral significance to visual features. This framework successfully explains not 
only early visual representations but also rapid object recognition, a key function of the primate 
visual system [6].  
In recent years, the feedforward view of visual processing has undergone significant 
revision, with increasing appreciation for the role of feedback from higher cortical centers, as well 
as highly precise recurrent and lateral connectivity [7,8]. For instance, lateral connections are 
thought to mediate response modulation specific to the geometry of object boundaries, an 
important process for visual scene segmentation [8,9]. Top-down feedback allows V1 to act as an 
adaptive processor influenced by brain states; for instance, it can lead to attentional modulation 
that may even contribute to visual awareness [7,10]. A simple, yet dramatic example for how 
behavioral state impacts V1 is the observation that when mice run, the stimulus-evoked firing of 
V1 neurons can double while retaining stimulus selectivity [11,12,13]. In fact, primary sensory 
cortices have dedicated neurons that can represent not only low-level stimulus features but even 
behavioral contingencies such as reinforcers [14,15]. 
A particularly intriguing line of investigation into non-sensory representations in visual 
cortex was initiated by Shuler and Bear [1]. They fitted rats with head-mounted goggles that 
delivered full-field retinal stimulation to either the left or the right eye. These stimuli were cues 
that predicted the delayed delivery of a drop of water a few seconds later (Figure 1A). Their 
surprising discovery was that many rat V1 neurons modify their cue-evoked firing to predict the 
expected time of future rewards — coined ‘reward timing activity’ [1]. These reward-timing 
responses come in three different varieties: some neurons show sustained activation from stimulus 
presentation to the expected time of reward, others show inhibition during the same period, and a 
third group exhibits a firing rate peak at the expected reward time (Figure 1B). Liu et al. [4] in this 
issue build on this work to better understand the mechanisms by which V1 neurons can be trained 
to exhibit such responses. 
What might be the circuit origin of reward timing activity in V1? Is it a reflection of a 
‘cognitive’ brain function that is relayed from other, higher cortical areas, such as the prefrontal 
cortex, via top-down feedback connections? Alternatively, cue-reward intervals may be generated 
within V1 circuitry, so that their timing needs to be learned with the help of an external 
reinforcement signal [4]. Neuromodulatory systems are a good candidate for providing such 
reinforcement signals as they are able to broadcast behaviorally relevant events broadly across 
cortical areas. Dopaminergic neurons in particular have been shown to represent reward prediction 
error signals that could be used for learning timed intervals [16]. However, V1 does not receive 
strong dopaminergic input and therefore Liu et al. [4] focused on another classic neuromodulator: 
acetylcholine.   
Cholinergic neurons of the basal forebrain (BF) densely innervate V1, and are known to 
control cortical plasticity and enable sensory map reorganization [17,18]. To test the idea that they 
may provide the reinforcement signal required for reward timing, Liu et al. [4] rendered basal 
forebrain neurons light-responsive by expressing channelrhodopsin-2, and directed light onto axon 
terminals projecting to V1. They trained mice with an optogenetic conditioning protocol, in which 
they first provided a light cue to one of the eyes, and then after a delay activated the BF→V1 
projection. Using this training protocol outside of a behavioral task led to the emergence of the 
same three types of reward timing activity as if the reward had been delivered. The optogenetically-
conditioned responses retained their plasticity and were modifiable by further conditioning to 
either shorter or longer intervals. Thus replacing actual rewards with optogenetic activation of 
basal forebrain inputs to V1 is sufficient to recapitulate reward timing activity in V1 neurons. 
The basal forebrain contains a neurochemically heterogeneous population of projection 
neurons, not only cholinergic ones. Therefore, Liu et al. [4] repeated this experiment, this time 
using cholinergic-specific optogenetic stimulation within visual cortex, and found that it was 
indeed sufficient to induce timing activity. One potential caveat to this experiment, however, is 
that in addition to the cholinergic BF→V1 projection they likely also activated a class of local 
interneurons that are both cholinergic and express the neuropeptide VIP. These VIP interneurons 
were shown to be activated by both reward and punishment in another primary sensory area, 
auditory cortex — and could contribute to this effect [14]. On the other hand, Chubykin et al. [2] 
also demonstrated that cholinergic-specific lesions of basal forebrain prevent the acquisition of 
reward timing activity in V1. In addition, even an isolated V1 slice in vitro could express reward 
timing activity via cholinergic mechanisms, further supporting the notion that reward timing 
activity emerges in V1 ‘de novo’ and not simply transmitted from higher cortical regions [2]. 
Taken together these studies provide a compelling case that basal forebrain cholinergic neurons 
are both necessary and sufficient for inducing reward timing activity. 
Liu et al. [4] went on to establish a remarkable property of reward timing activity. 
Theoretically, a population of V1 neurons could encode not only the mean but also the animal’s 
temporal uncertainty about reward timing. Reward timing uncertainty should decrease with 
experience and increase with the duration of the time interval represented. Indeed, the authors 
found that further optogenetic conditioning decreased the variability of neural report of time, 
suggesting an experience-dependent decrease in the reported temporal uncertainty (Figure 1C). A 
general property of elapsed time estimation is that it follows Weber’s law, that is, the variance of 
time estimates increases linearly with elapsed time, referred to as scalar timing. The authors tested 
this hypothesis and determined that the variance of V1 timing activity increases with the learned 
time duration, thus exhibiting the scalar timing property (Figure 1C). This result meshes nicely 
with a recent report by some of the same authors [19] demonstrating that Weber’s law in time 
estimation leads to Weber’s law in neural representations of subjective value and reward 
magnitude. They showed mathematically that multiple sources of noise result in scalar properties 
under the assumptions of an ecological model of decision making. This result is likely rooted in 
the generality of the Poisson limit theorem postulating that discrete distributions combining 
multiple independent sources of influence (such as the number of spikes fired by a neuron) can be 
approximated by Poisson distributions — and may explain the ubiquity of scalar representations 
in the brain. These results suggest that timing is represented in a population code in V1 that 
provides an estimate of both the mean and temporal uncertainty about anticipated reward time 
(Figure 1C-D). 
Regardless of the precise mechanisms, these observations provide the clearest indication 
that visual cortex activity represents an internal model of the world beyond sensory signals. But is 
there behavioral relevance to time coding in V1? Another recent paper by Namboodiri and 
colleagues [3] take a big step forward in addressing this question. They trained rats on a visually 
cued interval timing task in which rats received reward proportional to their waiting time — but 
only up to a threshold, beyond which no reward was delivered. Rats learned to wait for the optimal 
interval, neither too short nor too long, albeit with natural variability from trial-to-trial. They found 
that in a large population of V1 neurons trial-to-trial variation in reward timing activity was 
correlated with behavioral waiting time. Moreover, optogenetic perturbation of V1 during the 
timed intervals led to an increase in waiting times, suggesting that V1 is causally involved in 
visually cued timed actions. 
[h1] megjegyzést írt: no this is the ‘thus’ I meant. increase is 
not scalar timing, either omit ‘thus’ or say ‘linearly increase’ 
These exciting findings raise a host of new questions about reward timing activity. One 
issue is whether reward has a special role in entraining V1 neurons, or might punishment also 
recruit similar basal forebrain mechanisms? Further studies will be required to understand the 
circuit and molecular mechanisms by which basal forebrain achieves training. Previous in vitro 
experiments revealed muscarinic effects [2] — however, precise timing may necessitate faster, 
nicotinic mechanisms as well. Potentially the cholinergic system might also rapidly engage 
specific cortical cell types and circuits [20] and exert some of its impact via cortical disinhibition 
[14,15].  
Finally, perhaps the most burning open question raised by these studies is how reward 
timing activity maps onto other, better understood functions of V1? Are visual feature detection 
and temporal anticipation segregated at the circuit level, involving partially non-overlapping cell 
types or cortical layers? Or instead are these processes interwoven reflecting a broader unified 
function of visual cortex in making behaviorally relevant predictions based on visual information? 
These new questions will undoubtedly move research beyond the textbook paradigm of 
feedforward visual processing and lead to the exploration of novel principles for cortical 
computation as the construction of internal models of the world. 
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Figure 1. Reward timing activity in neural populations of visual cortex. 
(A) Experimental paradigm: mice received visual stimuli that predicted water reward or laser 
stimulation of basal forebrain projections to V1 after a fixed delay. (B) Responses of V1 neurons 
from the visual cue (green dashed line) to the reward (blue dashed line) anticipate reward time. 
Three types of interval coding neurons were found in V1: sustained activated, sustained inhibited 
and peak firing neurons corresponding to neural expectation of waiting time. (C) V1 activity can 
be decoded to generate a neural report of waiting time. The variance of the neural report of time 
increased with waiting time and decreased with experience. (D) The neural report of time encodes 
uncertainty and follows scalar timing for waiting time. With more experience there is less increase 
of uncertainty with longer waiting times. 
In Brief: 
Little is known about how the brain learns to anticipate the timing of reward. A new study 
demonstrates that optogenetic activation of basal forebrain input is sufficient to train reward timing 
activity in the primary visual cortex. 
 
